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THE ROLE OF MONITORING OF CORRUPTION IN A SIMPLE
ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL
RAFFAELLA COPPIER, MAURO COSTANTINI, and GUSTAVO PIGA∗
This article analyzes the relationship between economic growth and the monitoring
of corruption. In our theoretical model, we derive a nonlinear relationship between the
level of monitoring and economic growth, as well as between corruption and economic
growth. At low monitoring levels, the economy experiences widespread corruption and
medium growth rates, whereas no corruption occurs at intermediate monitoring levels,
but low growth rates are recorded. At high monitoring levels, no corruption takes
place and high growth rates are observed. The model is estimated using a dynamic
panel data approach for Italy. Empirical results support the theoretical model. (JEL
C33, D73, K42)
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last 30 years, economists from
various fields have contributed to the analy-
sis of corruption. The first paper to receive
widespread attention was published in 1975
(Rose-Ackerman 1975). Since then a large lit-
erature has developed and much attention has
been paid to the relationship between cor-
ruption and economic growth. In the analysis
of the consequences of corruption, the lit-
erature supports two opposing positions. On
one hand, common wisdom views corruption
as an obstacle (sand) to development and
growth; on the other hand, other researchers,
since the pioneering works of Leff (1964) and
Huntington (1968), have suggested that corrup-
tion may promote efficiency by allowing firms
to bypass government failures of various sorts
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(grease corruption). More recent expositions of
efficiency-enhancing corruption can be found in
Lui (1985), Acemoglu and Verdier (1998, 2000),
and Barreto (2000). Barreto (2000) presents a
simple neoclassical endogenous growth model
where the public sector’s monopolistic position
is explicitly considered. Results indicate that a
corruption equilibrium is characterized by lower
growth rates compared to the ideal situation in
which public goods are provided competitively.
Barreto (2000) also shows that if the public sec-
tor is subject to significant bureaucratic red-tape,
all of the agents within the economy may pre-
fer the corruption equilibrium, as corruption can
bypass bureaucratic obstacles.
From a theoretical point of view, there are
several ways in which corruption may reduce
economic growth. Corruption can act as a tax
and thus lower incentives to invest. Corruption
could cause talented people to engage in rent-
seeking rather than productive activities. Cor-
ruption may distort the composition of govern-
ment expenditure, as corrupt politicians could
be expected to invest in large non-productive
projects from which considerable bribes can
be extracted more easily than from productive
activities.
Empirical analysis has also provided evi-
dence of the negative effects of corruption on
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economic growth. Mauro (1995) shows that cor-
ruption reduces economic growth, via reduced
private investment.1 Similar results are obtained
by Keefer and Knack (1995) using other mea-
sures of corruption and a different selection of
countries.2 Recently, the “grease the wheels”
hypothesis has been tested and statistically sup-
ported (see Aidt 2009; Campos, Dimova, and
Ahmad 2010; Me´on and Sekkat 2005, among
others).
In this article, we develop a theoretical
endogenous growth model which incorporates
corruption. In our model, the social loss brought
about by corruption stems from the fact that
firms must bribe a bureaucrat in order to
invest, and consequently devote fewer resources
to the accumulation of capital. Therefore, in
our model, corruption has a negative effect
on private investment. Other models share our
framework. Ehrlich and Lui (1999) claim that
individuals have an incentive to compete over
the privilege of becoming bureaucrats (the so-
called investment in political capital) since they
obtain economic rents through corruption. This
investment in political capital consumes eco-
nomic resources which could otherwise be used
for production or investment in human capi-
tal. In Del Monte and Papagni (2001), cor-
ruption arises when bureaucrats manage public
resources to produce public goods and services.
Corruption reduces the quality of public infras-
tructure resulting in a negative effect on eco-
nomic growth.
The novel feature of this article is the study
of the impact of monitoring of corruption on
economic growth.3 In our theoretical model,
we derive a nonlinear relationship between
the level of monitoring and economic growth,
as well as between corruption and economic
1. For a recent review of Mauro’s influential work see
Shaw, Katsaiti, and Jurgilas (2011).
2. Since corruption data are available, almost exclu-
sively, at the aggregate country level, most of the empirical
literature has focused on cross-country analysis. An excep-
tion is, for example, Mocan (2008) who investigates the
determinants of being asked for a bribe at the individual
level.
3. The implicit assumption in our work, as in most of
the literature, is that a higher monitoring level will reduce
corruption. However, as stressed by Svensson (2005), the
institutions are weak in many poor countries and, there-
fore, providing more resources for monitoring activities
might not be the right strategy in order to reduce cor-
ruption. In fact, little evidence exists—Hong Kong and
Singapore are the most cited exceptions—that allocat-
ing more resources to monitoring institutions will reduce
corruption.
growth.4 At low monitoring levels, the economy
experiences widespread corruption and medium
growth rates, whereas no corruption occurs at
intermediate monitoring levels, but low growth
rates are recorded. At high monitoring levels, no
corruption takes place and high growth rates are
observed.
The nonlinear relationship between growth
and monitoring is finally investigated empiri-
cally over the period 1980–2003 in Italy. To
study this relationship, new measures of moni-
toring are used. Our empirical evidence supports
the conclusions of the model.
The article is organized as follows: Section
II studies the relationship between the level of
monitoring, corruption, and economic growth.
In Section III, empirical implications from the
theoretical model are evaluated. Section IV
concludes.
II. THEORETICAL MODEL
Let us consider an infinite horizon economy
in continuous time admitting a representative
household with the standard constant relative
risk aversion preferences. We also assume that
the representative household owns a balanced
portfolio of all the firms in the economy. Alter-
natively, we can think of the economy as con-
sisting of many households with the same pref-
erences as the representative household in each
household holding a balanced portfolio of all the
firms. Following Acemoglu (2009), the ability to
hold a balanced portfolio of projects with inde-
pendently disputed returns allows the individual
to diversify the risks and act in a risk-neutral
manner.5 This will imply that the objective of
each firm will be to maximize expected prof-
its (without a risk premium). Firms manufacture
4. See also Cerqueti, Coppier, and Piga (2012) for a
nonlinear relationship between corruption and economic
growth.
5. “When individuals are risk averse, this may imply
that there should be a risk premium associated with such
stochastic streams of income. This is not necessarily the
case, however, when the following three conditions are
satisfied:
(1) there are many firms involved in research;
(2) the realization of the uncertainty across firms is
independent;
(3) consumers and firms have access to a ‘stock market,’
where each consumer can hold a balanced portfolio of
various research firms.
When this is the case, even though each firm’s revenue
is risky, the balanced portfolio held by the representative
household will have deterministic returns,” pp. 562–563.
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a single homogeneous good y with one input-
capital using one of the two technologies with
constant returns to scale: the modern sector tech-
nology and the one of the traditional sector. Each
firm is assumed to have the same quantity of
capital k. The product may be either manufac-
tured for consumption purposes or for invest-
ment purposes. The modern sector technology is
y = aMk. The firms in the modern sector must
obtain a license from the government to access
the technology. To obtain such a license, a firm
must submit a project to a bureaucrat and this act
involves an implementation cost of sk.6 The firm
may access the traditional sector without any
license being issued. In this case the output is
y = aT k. From this point onwards, it is assumed
that (aM − s) > aT > 0, that is the modern sec-
tor is more profitable than the traditional sector.
While households may invest their capital in the
modern sector or in the traditional one, bureau-
crats cannot invest in the production activity,
earning a fixed salary w.7 Bureaucrats are cor-
ruptible, in the sense that they pursue their own
interest, and not necessarily that of the State.
Bureaucrats are open to bribery as they issue
the license required to access the modern sector
technology to the firms submitting a project. The
State controls the bureaucrats in such a way that
they have a probability q (monitoring level) of
being detected if they undertake a corrupt trans-
action.
In this model, the bureaucrat may decide not
to ask for a bribe and to issue the license to
those firms who submit a project, or else to
ask for a bribe (b hereafter) in exchange for
the license. Since (aM − s) > aT , the firm might
find it worthwhile to offer a bribe to the corrupt
bureaucrat with a view to obtaining the neces-
sary license to access the modern sector. The
bureaucrat is assumed to have both monopolistic
power (i.e., after having submitted the project,
the firm cannot turn to any other bureaucrat to
obtain the license) and discretional power over
granting the license (i.e., the bureaucrat may
refuse to issue the license without being required
6. The cost of the project submission to the bureaucrat
is a function of the investment. The underlying assumption
is that, as the size of the investment grows, the cost for the
firm’s bureaucratic practices also grows.
7. It is assumed that no arbitrage is possible between the
public and the private sector allowing bureaucrats to become
households, even if their salary w is lower than the firm’s
net return. This may be assumed since although individuals
in the population (bureaucrats) have a job, they have no
access to capital markets, and therefore may not become
households.
to provide any explanation). If the bureaucrat is
detected while performing a corrupt transaction,
he/she incurs a cost (either monetary, moral,
or criminal) equal to mk, where m >08; the
firm, if detected, incurs a cost (either monetary,
moral, or criminal) equal to ck, where c >0, but
the cost of the bribe paid to the bureaucrat is
refunded.9
A. Game Description
In the following, we refer to the firm payoff
by using the superscript (F) and to the bureaucrat
payoff by using the superscript (B). These
represent the first and the second element of
the payoff vector η
i
, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively,
as it will become clear below there are four
payoff configurations. Consider the following
three-stage game:
Stage 1. At Stage 1 of the game, the firm
decides in which sector to operate, that is,
whether to invest its capital in the modern or
in the traditional sector. Such a decision is
tantamount to the decision of whether to submit
the project to the bureaucrat, considering that a
license is needed to invest in the modern sector.
Project submission does not automatically result
in the bureaucrat issuing a license, as he/she may
refuse to grant the license unless a bribe b is
paid. If the firm decides not to submit the project
(preferring to invest in the traditional sector
instead) the game ends and then the payoff
vector is given by:
η1 = (aT k,w).(1)
If the firm decides to submit the project, it asks
the bureaucrat to issue the license. In this case
the game continues to Stage 2.
Stage 2. At this stage the bureaucrat, on
facing a firm who has submitted a project
incurring a cost sk, may decide to issue the
license without asking for a bribe (b = 0).10 In
this case the game ends and the payoff vector is
given by:
η2 = (aMk − sk,w).(2)
Alternatively, if he/she demands the payment of
a bribe (b > 0) from the firm before agreeing to
issue the license, the game continues to Stage 3.
8. Like Harstad and Svensson (2011), we assume that
the penalty increases in k because the penalty for such a
serious crime is larger.
9. See Rose-Ackerman (1999) for details regarding the
assumption of a non-constant punishment function.
10. If agents are indifferent about whether to ask for a
bribe or not, they will prefer to be honest.
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Stage 3. At Stage 3, the payoffs will depend
on whether, on one hand, the agreement between
the bureaucrat and the firm is achieved or not
and, on the other hand, whether the bureaucrat
and the firm are reported (with probability
q) or not. Should it decide to negotiate the
payment of a bribe with the bureaucrat, the two
parties will find the bribe corresponding to the
Nash solution to a bargaining game (bNB). If
agreement is not reached, the bureaucrat will
refuse to issue the license; thus the game ends
with the bureaucrat receiving his/her salary and
the firm, after having been denied the license,
will be left with no other option but to invest in
the traditional sector. In this case, the game ends
and the corresponding payoff vector is given by:
η3 = (aT k − sk,w).(3)
If agreement is reached, the expected payoffs
will depend on the probability q with which the
bureaucrat and the firm are monitored.11 In this
case, the expected payoff vector is given by:
η4 =
(
(aM − s)k − qck − bNB(1 − q),(4)
× w − qmk + bNB(1 − q)).
It should be noted that η2 is preferred to η3 byboth agents, and therefore the bureaucrat will
never ask for a bribe if he/she knows that the
agreement will not be achieved.
B. The Solution to the Game
The model described in the previous section
well reflects the pervasive uncertainty which
is typically experienced by firms when dealing
with the Public Administration. The game may
be solved by starting from the last stage using
backward induction, determining the bribe bNB
(which is the Nash solution to a bargaining
game). The bribe bNB is the outcome of a
negotiation between the bureaucrat and the firm
(see Appendix A for the proof).
11. It is possible to consider q to depend on the number
of corrupt individuals or on other economic variables as,
for example, fiscal revenues. We deliberately avoid doing
this in order to better highlight how the monitoring level
can influence the economic growth rate (this approach
has been also considered by Blackburn, Bose, and Haque
2006, 2010; Del Monte and Papagni 2001; Fan 2006;
Friehe 2008; Mishra 2006). Furthermore, there is no clear-
cut evidence regarding how the level of corruption may
endogenously affect the monitoring activity. In fact, some
literature considers that the greater the corruption rate, the
more likely the detection is (see, e.g., Barreto 2000); while
other authors assume that the more corrupt people there are,
the less might be the probability of being caught (see Mauro
2004; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1993).
PROPOSITION 1. Let q = 1.12 Then there is
a unique non negative bribe (bNB), as the Nash
solution to a bargaining game, given by:
bNB = α[(aM − aT )k/(1 − q)(5)
−(q(c − m)k/(1 − q))],
where α and (1 − α) are parameters which can
be interpreted as the bargaining strength mea-
sures of the bureaucrat and the firm, respectively.
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that
the firm and the bureaucrat share the surplus on
an equal basis.13 Thus we have a standard Nash
case, when α = (1 − α) = 1/2 and the firm and
the bureaucrat receive equal shares. Hence the
bribe is equal to:
bNB = 1/2[((aM − aT )k/(1 − q))(6)
− (q(c − m)k/(1 − q))].
Static Analysis. The game is solved by means of
backward induction starting from the last stage
and the solution is formalized by the following
proposition (see Appendix A).14
PROPOSITION 2. Define q2 = ((aM − aT )/
(c + m)) − (2s/(c + m)) and q1 = (aM − aT )/
(c + m) with q1 > q2. Then, if q2 ≥ 0, q1 ≤ 1
and (c + m) > 2s:
(C) If q ∈ [0, q2] then the equilibrium payoff
vector is:
(7)
η4 =
(
((aM + aT )k/2) − sk − (q(c + m)k/2),
w + ((aM − aT )k/2) − (q(c + m)k/2)
)
this is the payoff vector connected to equilibrium
C (see below);
(B) if q2 < q < q1 the equilibrium payoff vec-
tor is:
η1 = (aT k,w)(8)
this is the payoff vector connected to equilibrium
B (see below);
12. If q = 1 this stage of the game is never reached.
13. Leaving the bargaining strength of the bureaucrat
and of the firm generic, that is equal to α and 1 − α,
respectively, does not change qualitatively the results of the
static game and, therefore of the dynamic one. The proof is
available upon request.
14. We here focus on the case where parameters allow
the greatest number of equilibria depending on the level of
monitoring by the State. In Appendix A we show the results
under all parameter conditions.
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(A) If q ∈ [q1, 1] the equilibrium payoff vec-
tor is:
η2 = ((aM − s)k,w)(9)
this is the payoff vector connected to equilibrium
A (see below).
The previous proposition shows that, depending
on the parameter values, one of the three perfect
Nash equilibria is obtained in the subgames:
• Equilibrium C: corruption and high output.
When 0 ≤ q ≤ q2, that is if the monitoring level
is low enough, the firm will enter the modern
sector and will be asked to pay a bribe by
the bureaucrat. Monitoring intensity is so low
that the difference in gross profits, (aM − aT )k,
between the modern and the traditional sector
is high enough to outweigh a (relatively low)
expected cost of corruption and the cost of the
project.
• Equilibrium B: no corruption and low out-
put. When q2 < q < q1, that is if the monitoring
level is intermediate, the firm will not enter the
modern sector and therefore will not ask for a
license. Monitoring intensity is not low enough
for the firm to justify paying for the cost of the
project along with the additional expected cost
of paying a bribe. The difference in gross prof-
its between the modern and the traditional sector
does not compensate for the expected cost of cor-
ruption plus the cost of the project. Furthermore,
monitoring intensity is not of a high enough level
to deter the bureaucrat from asking for a bribe
where the firm would have paid to pay the cost
of the project.
• Equilibrium A: no corruption and high
output. When q ≥ q1, that is if the monitoring
level is high enough, the level of monitoring
intensity by the State is so high that the firm
would turn down a request for a bribe even
after having paid the (sunk) cost of submitting
a project. Realizing this fact, the bureaucrat
will refrain from asking for a bribe to issue
the license. Thus the firm will enter the modern
sector and will not be asked for a bribe by the
bureaucrat.
Notice that in equilibrium B there is no corrup-
tion, but low output compared to equilibrium C,
where corruption is at its highest, but output is
higher. Should a State wish to lead the econ-
omy toward one of these three viable equilibria
by employing a certain level of monitoring, it
would realize that equilibria A and C imply a
greater output than equilibrium B. Equilibria A
and C allow the same output to be obtained, even
though they are considerably different from one
another in terms of level of corruption (which is
greatest in C and nonexistent in A).
From a static perspective, equilibrium A is
better than equilibrium C which implies the same
output as equilibrium A but is characterized by
widespread corruption, entailing a higher cost,
summarized by parameters c and m. A is also
better than B, while B and C cannot be ranked
a priori.
Dynamic Analysis. Following the work of Del
Monte and Papagni (2007), we expand the game
perspective in order to examine the dynamic
consequences of corruption on investment and
hence on economic growth. As we said, the
household’s satisfaction is derived from con-
sumption according to a simple constant elas-
ticity utility function:
U = (C1−σ − 1)/(1 − σ)
Each household maximizes utility over an infi-
nite period of time subject to a budget constraint.
This problem is formalized as:
max
c∈+
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU(C)dt
subject to
•
k = ηFi − C,
where C is consumption, ρ is the discount rate
over time, ηFi is the household’s payoff.
Since ηFi is different in each of the three
equilibria, the problem is solved for each of the
three cases. In the equilibrium with corruption
(equilibrium C), the household’s payoff is:
ηF4 =
[
(aM + aT )k/2 − sk − (q(c + m)k/2)
]
,
thus the constraint is:
•
k =
[
((aM + aT )k/2) − sk
− (q(c + m)k/2)] − C.
The Hamiltonian function is:
H = e−ρt (C1−σ − 1/1 − σ) + λ[((aM + aT )k/2)
− sk − (q(c + m)k/2) − C]
where λ is a costate variable. Optimization
provides the following first-order conditions:
e−ρtC−σ − λ = 0(10)
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and
•
λ = −λ[((aM + aT )/2)(11)
− s − (q(c + m)/2)].
By differentiating the first condition in Equation
(10) with respect to time and substituting it
into the second condition in Equation (11), the
consumption growth rate is obtained:
γCC = 1/σ
[
((aM + aT )/2)
−s − (q(c + m)/2) − ρ].
In equilibrium A, the household’s payoff is
ηF2 = aMk − sk.
In this case, optimization provides the first-
order conditions that allow the corresponding
consumption growth rate to be obtained:
γCA = 1/σ[aM − s − ρ].
In equilibrium B, the household’s payoff is
ηF1 = aT k
and the corresponding consumption growth
rate is
γCB = 1/σ[aT − ρ].
It should be noted that:
γCA > γ
C
C > γ
C
B,
that is equilibrium A (no corruption, high-level
monitoring) has the highest consumption growth
rate; in equilibrium C (pervasive corruption,
low monitoring) the consumption growth rate is
intermediate; and finally in equilibrium B (no
corruption, intermediate monitoring level) the
firm invests in the traditional sector, with low
profits, low accumulation of capital, and a low
growth rate. Furthermore, it can be shown that
capital and income also have the same growth
rate as consumption. Therefore, of the three
equilibria, from a dynamic viewpoint, equilib-
rium A is the most conducive to economic
growth. This is shown in Figure 1 in terms of
monitoring level and growth rate: equilibrium A
(high-level monitoring without corruption) pro-
duces the highest growth rate since the firms,
who are investing in the modern sector with-
out paying bribes, are able to generate greater
accumulation of capital; in equilibrium C the
growth rate is intermediate, since although the
firm manages to invest in the modern sector, it
must pay bribes in order to do so and ends up
FIGURE 1
Monitoring and the Growth Rate
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Equilibrium C Equilibrium B Equilibrium A
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accumulating less; finally in equilibrium B the
firm invests in the traditional sector, with low
revenues and low accumulation of capital. Thus
a nonlinear U-shaped relationship between the
monitoring of corruption and economic growth
is obtained and this shall be tested empirically
in the next section.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The relatively recent Italian nationwide Mani
Pulite (“Clean Hands”) scandal, in conjunction
with judicial authorities implementing greater
levels of monitoring as a consequence, dras-
tically affected Italy’s economic environment.
This Italian experience lends itself naturally to
verifying the impact of the monitoring level on
corruption and growth.15 This section aims to
empirically investigate the relationship between
the level of monitoring of corruption and eco-
nomic growth in Italy. The nonlinear character
of the relationship between the monitoring level
and the growth rate of income is formalized
by using an empirical specification reflecting a
15. Mani pulite (Italian for “Clean Hands”) was a
nationwide Italian judicial investigation into political corrup-
tion, held in the 1990s. As Della Porta and Vannucci (1999)
said “In Italy the history of corruption does not begin (let
alone end) on February 17, 1992 (the official date that Clean
Hands began). What starts at that point are the extraordinary
events of public exposure of corruption, a scandal affecting
the highest levels of the political and economic system, caus-
ing the most serious political crisis of the Italian Republic”.
The corruption system that is uncovered by these investiga-
tions is usually referred to as Tangentopoli, or “bribesville.”
1978 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
parabolic relationship between these two vari-
ables. The theoretical model is tested using new
monitoring measures. The empirical analysis is
first performed considering all the Italian regions
and then three subsamples, namely the North,
Center, and South of Italy. The three subsamples
are considered in order to investigate whether
the U-shaped relationship may simply reflect the
structural differences within the subsamples.
A. Data
The empirical analysis is based on annual
data from Italian regions over the period 1980–
2003. With the exception of monitoring and
human capital variables, the annual data are
drawn from the Prometeia Regional Account-
ing data set (courtesy of ISAE). The data relat-
ing to monitoring are selected from ISTAT and
the Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze,
and data regarding human capital are drawn
from the Costantini and Destefanis (2009) data
set. Appendix B provides a detailed descrip-
tion of the variables and their sources. The
descriptive statistics of the variables are found
in Appendix C.
With regard to the monitoring variable, three
different measures are provided with a view to
study the effects of monitoring on economic
growth. The first is based on the number of cor-
ruption crimes and is denoted as M1. The second
and the third measures use the number of per-
tinent judges and police officers as proxies to
indicate how much of the State resources are
allocated to fighting corruption-related crimes.
These two measures are denoted as M2 and
M3, respectively. The first measure (M1) is the
ratio between the number of corruption crimes
detected and the estimated total number of cor-
ruption crimes (see Appendix D). This is an ex-
post variable since it only considers the results
of State control activity. Therefore, this index
expresses the effectiveness of the monitoring
activity, that is the monitoring that leads to the
corrupt bureaucrat being successfully charged.
The second and third measures are based on
the number of judges assigned to penal law
cases (M2) and on the number of police offi-
cers employed in the investigation of corruption
crimes (M3), respectively. Incentives for corrup-
tion increase as the probability of being caught
and punished decreases and this probability is
positively dependent on the actions of judges
and police officers. These two proxies are of an
ex-ante nature, since they allow us to assess the
level of monitoring implemented by the State.
B. Estimation Methods
The specification of the basic estimated
equation corresponds to a reduced form so as
to evaluate the implications of the theoretical
model. We consider the following specification
equation:
gyit = β1lnyit−1 + β2ln(monitorit−1)(12)
+ β3(ln(monitorit−1))2
+ β4invit + β5conpait + β6hit + εit
εit = μi + λt + νit
where the disturbance error term, εit , has three
components: the fixed effect (which accounts for
any individual-specific effect), μi , the unobserv-
able time effect (which accounts for any time-
specific effect and it is individual-invariant), λt ,
and the idiosyncratic shocks, νit (see Baltagi
2005). gyit is the growth rate of per capita
income at 2000 constant prices, lnyit−1 is
the logarithm of the lagged value of the per
capita income level, ln(monitorit−1) is the
log monitoring level delayed by one period,
(ln(monitorit−1))2 is the square of the loga-
rithm of the monitoring variable lagged by one
period, invit is the share of investment in Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), conpait is public con-
sumption over GDP and hit is the stock of
human capital.16 The index i refers to the cross-
section dimension (regions) and the index t to
the time dimension. The share of investment
over GDP and the level of public consumption
over GDP are important control variables (see
Barro 1991 and Levine and Renelt 1992). The
monitoring variable is included in the equation
with a delay of one period for two reasons.
Firstly, changes in the monitoring level are very
likely to require some time before they influence
the agents’ decisions. Secondly, any distortions
due to simultaneity, resulting from the possible
endogeneity of the monitoring variable, need to
be mitigated, since a higher growth rate may
result in more tax revenue and, therefore, more
resources being allocated to monitoring activity.
Equation (12) is estimated using the system
generalized method of moments (GMM) esti-
mator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) with a finite
sample correction for the two-step covariance
matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005). This esti-
mator augments the difference GMM estimator
16. For a recent analysis on the determinants of growth,
see Reed (2009).
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developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) which
uses first-differences to remove the unobserved
time-invariant country-specific effects (“fixed
effects”) and instruments the right-hand side
variables in first-differenced equations using
levels of the series lagged two periods or more.
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the differ-
ence GMM estimator is likely to perform poorly
when the series are persistent. In this case the
available instruments are only weakly correlated
with endogenous variables, and the difference
GMM estimator is likely to suffer from serious
bias as well as imprecision. Blundell and Bond
(1998) suggest making use of additional infor-
mation besides the differences. They consider an
additional assumption which requires a restric-
tion on the initial conditions.17 This allows the
use of lagged first-difference of the series as
instruments for equations in level. Thus, the sys-
tem GMM estimator stacks the equations in first
differences and the equations in levels together
and employs both lagged levels and first dif-
ferences as internal instruments (see Roodman
2006).18 The consistency of the GMM estima-
tors depends on whether lagged values of the
explanatory variables are valid instruments in
the growth equation. In the empirical analysis,
we address this issue by considering two spec-
ification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The first
is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions,
which tests the overall validity of the instru-
ments by analyzing the sample analog of the
moment conditions used in the estimation pro-
cess. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives
support to the model. The second test examines
the null hypothesis that the error term is not
serially correlated. As in the case of the Sar-
gan test, the model specification is supported
when the null of no serial correlation cannot be
rejected. The estimation results are summarized
in Section C.
C. Results
The empirical results are reported in Tables
1–4. In the system GMM estimates, invest-
ment (Inv), human capital (hit ), and public con-
sumption (conpa) are treated as endogenous.
These endogenous variables are instrumented
with suitable lags of their own differences for
the regression equation (see notes in Table 1).
17. For further details see Blundell and Bond (1998).
18. For a discussion on endogeneity and system GMM
estimator see, e.g., Hijzen, Inui, and Todo (2010).
TABLE 1
Growth and Monitoring (All Italian Regions,
1980–2003)
Dependent Variable: gyit
Variables M1 M2 M3
ln(yi,t−1) −0.082 −0.088 −0.096
(2.83)∗∗∗ (2.84)∗∗∗ (2.91)∗∗∗
ln(monitori,t−1) −0.079 −0.099 −0.123
(2.72)∗∗∗ (3.09)∗∗∗ (2.93)∗∗∗
(ln(monitori,t−1))2 0.013 0.012 0.009
(3.17)∗∗∗ (2.40)∗∗ (3.00)∗∗
Inv 0.161 0.174 0.168
(3.04)∗∗∗ (3.05)∗∗∗ (2.95)∗∗∗
conpa 0.263 0.223 0.201
(2.58)∗∗ (2.42)∗∗ (2.37)∗∗
hit 0.050 0.058 0.059
(3.13)∗∗∗ (2.63)∗∗ (2.81)∗∗∗
constant 0.321 0.334 0.310
(1.34) (3.04)∗∗∗ (1.35)
Sargan test: χ2 16.92 16.79 16.35
p values .921 .928 .937
z-statistics 0.245 0.235 0.456
p values .749 .768 .659
No. of observations 475 457 457
Notes: Instruments used for Equation (12) are ln
(yi,t−2), ln(monitoringi,t−2), (ln(monitoringi,t−2))2,
Invit−1, conpait−1 and hit−1. t-Statistics are in
parentheses. z-statistics indicate Arellano-Bond test for
second-order autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗significant at
10% levels, respectively.
Results of Sargan tests of over-identifying
restrictions for the GMM estimator confirm the
validity of the instruments. For all the regres-
sions, we find that the p value is larger than 5%.
In addition, the results of the Arellano and Bond
(1991) tests for AR(2) autocorrelation in the
first-difference residuals show that null hypothe-
sis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected and
the moment conditions are correctly specified.
The coefficient on the lnyit is used to
test the convergence hypothesis. A negative
sign denotes conditional convergence of growth
rates. In our estimation, the sign of the param-
eter β1 is negative and also statistically signif-
icant in all the cases. The convergence rate is
stronger across the poorest regions (South) than
that across the richest regions (North). There-
fore, we can argue that the forces of convergence
are stronger in lower levels of per capita income
and less intensive in higher levels of income.
These results are in line with those in the Italian
literature (see, e.g., Cellini and Scorcu 1995).
The estimated regression coefficients of the
square of the logarithm of the monitoring
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variables are all positive and statistically signif-
icant (see Tables 1–4). Although these results
confirm the existence of a U-shaped relation-
ship as predicted by the theoretical model, dif-
ferences regarding the upward and downward
sloping part of the relationship are found at
macro-regional level (North, Center, and South)
and among the monitoring measures (M1, M2,
and M3).19 When considering all the Italian
regions as a whole, the upward sloping part
of the relationship is the most relevant for all
the monitoring measures. Furthermore, the pos-
itive marginal effects show that more monitoring
implies less corruption and therefore higher eco-
nomic growth. In this respect, the most effective
instrument of monitoring is represented by the
judicial system which is independent from the
political power (see Della Porta 2001).20
When accounting for the different macro-
area, contrasting results are found. As regards
the North and the Center of Italy, the upward
sloping part of the relationship is the most rele-
vant. Furthermore, among the monitoring mea-
sures, the most effective ex-ante instrument for
controlling for corruption seems to be the num-
ber of pertinent judges (M2), while the police
officers measure (M3) is the least effective.
In the South of Italy, the situation seems
to be reversed. The relevant part of the U-
shaped relationship is the downward sloping
one. Also, the negative marginal effects show
that a higher level of monitoring implies a lower
economic growth. This result can be interpreted
in light of the theoretical model: the South of
Italy mainly lies in a situation where a rise of
monitoring involves paying a higher bribe, fewer
resources are devoted to capital accumulation,
and lower economic growth is expected. In this
case the government is unable to prevent waste,
fraud, and mismanagement from occurring in the
monitoring activities and then it is likely to be
generally less effective in its capacity to govern
(see, e.g., Putnam 1993). When considering
the different measures of monitoring, a rise
19. We would like to thank a referee for having raised
this point.
20. In particular the author finds evidence that for
political corruption, “the efficacy of the magistracy is, to
a large extent, determined by its degree of independence
from political authority.... In Italy, there is an unusually high
level of (at least formal) independence of the judiciary from
political power. Mechanisms which can allow for a certain
degree of control by politicians over judges are not available
in Italy; the Constitution ensures that the magistracy could
not become the ‘long arm of the government’ as it had been
during the fascist regime.”
TABLE 2
Growth and Monitoring (Northern Italian
Regions, 1980–2003)
Dependent Variable: gyit
Variables M1 M2 M3
ln(yi,t−1) −0.068 −0.073 −0.085
(2.96)∗∗∗ (2.81)∗∗∗ (2.93)∗∗∗
ln(monitori,t−1) −0.078 −0.095 −0.0122
(3.01)∗∗∗ (2.97)∗∗∗ (2.84)∗∗∗
(ln(monitori,t−1))2 0.020 0.016 0.008
(2.86)∗∗∗ (2.67)∗∗ (2.67)∗∗
Inv 0.183 0.199 0.178
(3.21)∗∗∗ (2.93)∗∗∗ (2.58)∗∗
conpa 0.276 0.237 0.232
(2.56)∗∗ (2.52)∗∗ (2.64)∗∗
hit 0.053 0.052 0.050
(3.12)∗∗∗ (2.26)∗∗ (2.38)∗∗
constant 0.341 0.352 0.315
(1.48) (3.01)∗∗∗ (1.31)
Sargan test: χ2 16.17 16.41 16.51
p values .948 .924 .927
z-statistics 0.225 0.400 0.435
p values .779 .700 .690
No. of observations 192 187 187
Notes: Instruments used for Equation (12) are
ln(yi,t−2), ln(monitoringi,t−2), (ln(monitoringi,t−2))2,
Invit−1, conpait−1 and hit−1. t-Statistics are in paren-
theses. z-statistics indicate Arellano-Bond test for second-
order autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗significant at
10% levels, respectively.
in number, the police officers imply a smaller
reduction in the economic growth than that
obtained with an increase in the number of
pertinent judges.
As regards the investment/GDP ratio (Inv)
variable, the estimated coefficients are all posi-
tive and statistically significant in all the cases.
These results would seem to be in line with the
literature concerning growth models (see, e.g.,
Levine and Renelt 1992) and similar findings are
also found in other studies of Italian regions (see
Auteri and Costantini 2004). As far as the per-
formance of investment in the three subsamples
is concerned, a larger estimated coefficient is
found for the North of Italy (the estimated coef-
ficient varies from 0.178 to 0.199). This result
may be due to the fact that the public infrastruc-
tures are more developed in the North than in
the other macro-areas.
The public consumption variable has posi-
tive coefficients in all cases. When all the Italian
regions are considered, the estimated coefficient
values vary from 0.201 to 0.263 and are all
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TABLE 3
Growth and Monitoring (Central Italian
Regions, 1980–2003)
Dependent Variable: gyit
Variables M1 M2 M3
ln(yi,t−1) −0.073 −0.079 −0.094
(2.81)∗∗∗ (2.93)∗∗∗ (2.76)∗∗∗
ln(monitori,t−1) −0.071 −0.102 −0.116
(2.84)∗∗∗ (2.91)∗∗∗ (3.29)∗∗∗
(ln(monitori,t−1))2 0.017 0.011 0.007
(2.83)∗∗∗ (2.75)∗∗∗ (2.33)∗∗
Inv 0.109 0.139 0.136
(3.03)∗∗∗ (3.16)∗∗∗ (2.52)∗∗
conpa 0.214 0.209 0.201
(2.09)∗ (2.01)∗ (2.05)∗
hit 0.029 0.031 0.036
(2.42)∗∗ (2.39)∗∗ (2.77)∗∗
constant 0.402 0.389 0.401
(1.61) (1.46) (1.42)
Sargan test: χ2 15.90 16.02 15.02
p values .964 .951 .979
z-statistics 0.228 0.329 0.328
p values .772 .742 .744
No. of observations 94 87 87
Notes: Instruments used for Equation (12) are
ln(yi,t−2), ln(monitoringi,t−2), (ln(monitoringi,t−2))2,
Invit−1, conpait−1 and hit−1. t-Statistics are in paren-
theses. z-statistics indicate Arellano-Bond test for second-
order autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗significant at
10% levels, respectively.
statistically significant. Del Monte and Papagni
(2007) found similar results, although their evi-
dence of a positive impact of public consump-
tion on economic growth is weaker. As regards
the three subsamples, the highest value of the
estimated coefficient of public consumption is
found for the North of Italy. This result reflects
the fact that public expenditures are more effi-
cient in the North than in the other subsam-
ples. Indeed, Chang and Li (2011) point out
that what is important for the effectiveness of
public spending is not the size of the gov-
ernment, but the quality of the government
itself.
With respect to the human capital variable,
a positive and statistically significant effect on
economic growth is also found. The level of
education has a crucial impact on growth as
it determines the economy’s capacity to carry
out technological innovation (see, e.g., Woo
2009, on education and technology). When the
three subsamples are considered, the strongest
impact of human capital on economic growth
TABLE 4
Growth and Monitoring (Southern Italian
Regions, 1980–2003)
Dependent Variable: gyit
Variables M1 M2 M3
ln(yi,t−1) −0.103 −0.101 −0.108
(3.21)∗∗∗ (3.26)∗∗∗ (3.18)∗∗∗
ln(monitori,t−1) −0.070 −0.101 −0.121
(2.92)∗∗∗ (2.89)∗∗∗ (3.18)∗∗∗
(ln(monitori,t−1))2 0.013 0.008 0.007
(3.25)∗∗∗ (2.67)∗∗∗ (2.33)∗∗∗
Inv 0.100 0.101 0.102
(2.13)∗∗ (2.24)∗∗ (2.17)∗∗
conpa 0.199 0.198 0.178
(1.48) (1.83)∗ (1.82)∗
hit 0.011 0.021 0.012
(1.83)∗ (1.75)∗ (1.71)∗
constant 0.378 0.362 0.328
(1.61) (2.65)∗∗ (1.54)
Sargan test: χ2 16.91 17.10 16.87
p values .919 .898 .919
z-statistics 0.268 0.202 0.209
p values .740 .792 .790
No. of observations 189 183 183
Notes: Instruments used for Equation (12) are
ln(yi,t−2), ln(monitoringi,t−2), (ln(monitoringi,t−2))2,
Invit−1, conpait−1 and hit−1. t-Statistics are in paren-
theses. z-statistics indicate Arellano-Bond test for second-
order autocorrelation in the first-difference residuals.
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗significant at
10% levels, respectively.
is found in the Northern regions (the estimated
coefficient varies from 0.050 to 0.053).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, a new theoretical model of
the link between monitoring of corruption and
growth is developed. The model highlights
the nonlinear relationship between the level of
State monitoring and economic growth: when
monitoring against corruption is low (high),
high (low) corruption and high income pre-
vail. However, when monitoring is intermedi-
ate, income production in the economy remains
low. Similar results prevail in a dynamic frame-
work. The nonlinear relationship is investigated
using regional data for Italy over the period
1980–2003. An empirical analysis is then car-
ried out considering all Italian regions and the
three Italian macro-areas (North, Center, and
South). The empirical results confirm the exis-
tence of a U-shaped relationship as predicted by
the theoretical model, with differences regarding
1982 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
the upward and downward sloping part of the
relationship found at the macro-regional level.
In particular, we find, as predicted by our model,
that in the Northern and Center part of Italy
a direct relation between monitoring and eco-
nomic growth prevails, so that making controls
more pervasive depresses corruption and boosts
growth. On the contrary, in Southern Italy more
monitoring leads to less economic growth. This
is too coherent with our model where, when
monitoring is low to begin with—and corrup-
tion widespread but compatible with investment
and growth—and is raised through greater con-
trols, this induces bureaucrats to ask for a higher
bribe, depressing in turn investment and eco-
nomic activity. We believe that a nonlinear pat-
tern of this kind may provide also interesting
insights for the future study of cross-country
differences in the relationship between the fight
against corruption and growth.
APPENDIX A
THE NASH BARGAINING BRIBE bNB
Let φ

=φ(F ) ,φ(B) be the vector of the differences in the
payoffs between the case of agreement and disagreement
regarding the bribe between the firm and the bureaucrat.
In accordance with generalized Nash bargaining theory, the
division between two agents will solve:
max
b∈+
[φ(F ) ](1−α) · [φ(B) ]α(A1)
that is
max
b∈+
[
(aM − aT )k − ckq − (1 − q)b
](1−α)(A2)
× [(1 − q)b − qkm]α
which is the maximum of the product between the elements
of φ

and where [(aT k − sk), w] is the point of disagree-
ment, that is the payoffs that the firm and the bureaucrat
would obtain respectively if they failed to reach an agree-
ment. The parameters (1 − α) and α can be interpreted as
measures of bargaining strength. It is now easy to check
that the bureaucrat gets a share α of the surplus τ, that is the
bribe is bNB = ατ. More generally α reflects the distribution
of bargaining strength between the two agents.
Then the bribe bNB is an asymmetric (or generalized)
Nash bargaining solution and is given by:
bNB = α [((aM − aT )k/(1 − q)) − (q(c − m)k/(1 − q))]
(A3)
which is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame,
∀q = 1.
SOLUTION TO THE STATIC GAME
The static game is solved using backward induction,
which enables the equilibria to be obtained.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Backward induction method. 
(3) At Stage 3, the agreement is achieved if, and only if,
η
(F )
4 > η
(F )
3 ⇒ (aT k − sk) < ((aM + aT )k/2)
− sk − (q(c + m)k/2)
that is if the firm negotiates the bribe its payoff is greater
than its payoff if it refuses. That is verified ∀q < ((aM −
aT )/(c + m)) = q1.
Notice that in order to have an admissible probability
set, q must belong to [0, 1]. It should be noted that q1 is
greater than one by assumption.
Furthermore, from now on we assume that q1 < 1,
that is the difference in returns between the two sectors
must not be greater than the expected cost of corruption;
consequently the presence of the probability q determines
the firm’s choice of whether to enter into the transaction.
Then if q < q1 the firm negotiates the bribe, otherwise if
q ≥ q1 it refuses the bribe. Otherwise, if q1 ≥ 1 then the
firm will always negotiate the bribe (See Appendix A3 for
details).
(2) Ascending the decision-making tree, at Stage 2 the
bureaucrat decides whether or not to ask for a bribe.
• If q ≥ q1 then the bureaucrat knows that the firm will
not accept any bribe. Should he/she decide not to ask for
a bribe, his/her payoff will be w, whereas should he/she
decide to ask for a bribe, he/she knows there is no room
for negotiation, and therefore he/she will refuse to grant the
license to the firm, which will be forced to invest in the
traditional sector. In this case the bureaucrat’s payoff will
be w. Thus the bureaucrat’s payoff is the same as if he/she
decides to ask for a bribe equal to zero. As noted, in this
case of equal payoffs, it may be assumed that the bureaucrat
will prefer to be “honest,” and thus not ask for a bribe.
• If q < q1 then the bureaucrat knows that if he/she
asks for a bribe then the firm will start a negotiation and the
final bribe will be bNB. Then, at stage 2 the bureaucrat asks
for a bribe if and only if the bureaucrat’s payoff on asking
for a bribe is greater than his/her payoff if he/she does not.
η
(B)
4 > η
(B)
2 ⇒
w + ((aM − aT )k/2) − (q(c + m)k/2) > w
that holds ∀q < q1. Thus we can conclude that if q < q1
then the bureaucrat asks for a bribe which the firm accepts.
(1) At stage 1, the firm has to decide whether to present
the project.
• If q ≥ q1 then the firm knows that if it presents a
project no bribe will be asked. Should it decide not to submit
the project, its payoff will be equal to aT k, whereas if it
decides to submit its project, its payoff will be equal to
aMk − sk. Therefore, it will present the project if and only if
η
(F )
2 > η
(F )
1 ⇒ aMk − sk > aT .
The previous inequality is always verified by hypothesis.
• If q < q1 then the firm knows that the bureaucrat
will ask for the bribe which it will accept. Should it decide
not to submit the project, its payoff will be aT k, whereas
should it decide to submit the project and to pay the bribe
to the bureaucrat, its payoff will be ((aM − aT )k/2) − sk −
(q(c + m)k/2). Thus the firm decides to submit the project
if and only if
ηF4 ≥ ηF1 ⇒
((aM − aT )k/2) − sk − (q(c + m)k/2) ≥ aT k
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which is verified if and only if
q ≤ (((aM − aT ) − 2s)/(c + m)) = q2.
Because q2 < q1 and since we assumed that q1 ≤ 1, then
q2 ≤ 1. From now on we assume that q2 > 0, that is half
of the surplus (as the difference than the returns of the two
productivity sectors) must be greater than the project cost
(see Appendix A3 for the other cases).
EQUILIBRIA UNDER ALL PARAMETER CONDITIONS
If (c + m) ≥ 2s we obtain the following five cases
depending on parameter conditions:
TABLE A1
Equilibria (c + m) ≥ 2s
Parameter Conditions Equilibria
q2 < 0 ⇔ (aM − aT ) < 2s
and
q1 ≤ 1 ⇔ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c + m) Equilibria B and A
⇒ (aM − aT ) < 2s
q2 < 0 ⇔ (aM − aT ) < 2s
and
q1 > 1 ⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c + m) Not applicable
⇒ (aM − aT ) > (c + m) and
(aM − aT ) < 2s
q2 ≥ 0 ⇔ (aM − aT ) ≥ 2s
and
q1 ≤ 1 ⇔ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c + m) Proposition 2.2.
Equilibria C, B and A⇒ 2s ≤ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c + m)
1 > q2 ≥ 0 ⇒
2s ≤ (aM − aT ) < (c + m) + 2s
and
q1 > 1 ⇒ (aM − aT ) > (c + m) Equilibria C and B
⇒ (c + m) < (aM − aT ) <
(c + m) + 2s
q2 > 1 ⇔
(aM − aT ) > (c + m) + 2s
and
q1 > 1 ⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c + m) Equilibrium C
⇒ (aM − aT ) > (c + m) + 2s
If (c + m) < 2s we obtain the following five cases
depending on parameter conditions:
TABLE A2
Equilibria (c + m) < 2s
Parameter Conditions Equilibria
q2 < 0 ⇔ (aM − aT ) < 2s
and
q1 ≤ 1 ⇔ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c + m) Equilibria B and A
⇒ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c + m)
TABLE A2
Continued
Parameter Conditions Equilibria
q2 < 0 ⇔ (aM − aT ) < 2s
and
q1 > 1 ⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c + m) Equilibrium B
⇒ 2s > (aM − aT ) > c + m
q2 ≥ 0 ⇔ (aM − aT ) ≥ 2s
and
q1 ≤ 1 ⇔ (aM − aT ) ≤ (c + m) Not applicable
⇒ (aM − aT ) ≥ 2s and
(aM − aT ) ≤ (c + m)
1 > q2 ≥ 0 ⇔ 2s ≤ (aM − aT ) <
(c + m) + 2s
and
q1 > 1 ⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c + m) Equilibria C and B
⇒ 2s ≤ (aM − aT ) < (c + m) + 2s
q2 > 1 ⇔ (aM − aT ) >
(c + m) + 2s
and
q1 > 1 ⇔ (aM − aT ) > (c + m) Equilibrium C
⇒ (aM − aT ) > (c + m) + 2s
APPENDIX B
TABLE A3
Data and Sources
GDP at market prices
2000
1980–2003: PROMETEIA
Gross Fixed Investment 1980–2003: PROMETEIA
at 2000 prices
Corruption level 1980–2003: ISTAT
“Annuario Statistico e
Giudiziario”
various years
Criminal judges 1980–2003: Ministero
dell’Economia e delle Finanze
“Dipendenti delle
Amministrazioni Statali”
various issues
Police forces 1980–2003: Ministero del
Tesoro
“Dipendenti delle
Amministrazioni Statali”
various issues
Population 1980–2003: PROMETEIA
Public infrastructures
spending
1980–2003: PROMETEIA
at 2000 prices
Public consumption 1980–2003: PROMETEIA
at 2000 prices
1984 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
TABLE A3
Continued
Human capital 1980–2003: Costantini and
Destefanis (2009)
Notes: The legal statistics of ISTAT are one of the main
sources for region-based corruption analysis. Corruption
crimes fall into two classes of crimes considered by ISTAT.
The first class includes crimes by public officials considered
by the criminal code (arts. “314” and “322”) and referred
to as embezzlement of public funds or misappropriation
(art. “324”); the second class concerns private interests
in official deeds. The data considered in this study refer
to the total number of crimes classified by ISTAT with
classification numbers from “286” to “294,” namely: “286”
Embezzlement of public funds; “287” Embezzlement by
drawing profit from another’s error; “288” Misappropriation
to the damage of private individuals; “289” Extortion; “290”
Corruption for official deeds; “291” Corruption for deeds
contrary to official duties; “292” Corruption of a party
in charge of a public service; “293” Corruptor’s liability;
“294” Incitement to corruption; Police forces data include:
Arma dei Carabinieri (paramilitary police) and Polizia di
Stato (state police) (see “Conto Annuale,” “Dipendenti delle
amministrazioni statali”, codice “9,” Ministero del Tesoro);
Judges data include several categories (see codice “12”).
APPENDIX C
TABLE A4
Descriptive Statistics
Variables
No. of
Observa-
tions M Min Max SD
GDP 479 4.4 −9.6 5.6 0.559
(growth rate)
M1 478 2.230 0.967 3.204 0.336
M2 460 5.446 0.693 7.577 1.155
M3 460 8.448 5.575 10.822 1.010
Investment/GDP 480 0.228 0.142 0.448 0.056
Public
consump-
tion/GDP
480 0.248 0.129 0.396 0.067
Human capital 480 7.224 4.498 9.144 1.060
Notes: The growth rate of real per capita GDP is
expressed in percentages. With reference to public con-
sumption and investment, the unit of measurement used is
millions of Euro at 2000 constant prices. M1, M2, and M3
indicate the three measures of monitoring.
APPENDIX D
We consider the ratio between the number of detected
corruption crimes and the estimated total number of cor-
ruption crimes. The number of reported corruption crimes
is both a function of the corruption level and a function of
the level of prevention in place to reduce the phenomenon.
The probability of being detected, q, may be estimated by
the ratio between detected corruption crimes, Co, and the
estimated total number of corruption crimes, Ce:
q = Co/Ce(A4)
Most econometric studies find that corruption is a function of
several variables (the legal system, government intervention,
probability of being detected, etc.). Therefore, we can define
the estimated total number of corruption crimes:
Ce = A ∗ IP(A5)
where IP is public infrastructure spending, and the constant
A represents all the other variables which affect corruption.
The rationale for focusing on public infrastructure spend-
ing is that activities surrounding public works construction
are the classic locus of illegal monetary activities between
public officials, both elected and appointed, and businesses.
Although corruption occurs in settings other than public
works contracting, the process of public works contracting
is, because of inherent informational asymmetries, especially
vulnerable, as substantial empirical and theoretical litera-
tures suggest (see McMillan 1991; Porter and Zona 1993).
We assume that q is a nonlinear function of the moni-
toring level:
q = Monitoringα(A6)
By substituting Equations (A5) and (A6) in Equation (A4),
we have:
Monitoringα = Co/(A ∗ IP) ⇒(A7)
Co/IP = A ∗ Monitoringα(A8)
Taking logs, Equation (A8) is written as follows:
logCo/IP = logA + αlogMonitoring(A9)
Then we use logCo/IP as a proxy for the dynamic of
logMonitoring:
logmonitor = logdetected corruption crimes/
× public infrastructure spending.
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